This essay continues the exchange with a Russian friend, “Alexey,” about the war in Ukraine. You can read the essay that prompted his first reply here. Here’s his first reply. My reply to that is here. His reply is here. Mine is below.
Alexey—once again, no apologies needed.
Let’s start with where you’ve convinced me, and where I think any “crowdsourced ‘war’” needs to become more precise.
I said at the start that the aim of a crowdsourced ‘war’—as an alternative to a hot war—was to leverage the opportunity of connectedness to create maximal pressure on Putin with the least burden on those who could not matter to Putin. Much of what you’ve said in response is that in fact nothing matters to Putin except petrodollars, so that any burden on ordinary Russians—whether middle class or upper class—is simply unjust.
Maybe. And I’ll consider that more below. But one point to that end does seem right.
As we watch the reporting from Russia, it is striking to see how few seem to understand what’s actually going on. Here is where connectedness should be helping. But it is not. And so if, as you say, technology companies—specifically, VPN companies—are disengaging from Russia, that will only assure that connectedness cannot work. If there’s no way for uncensored information to flow into Russia, there’s little reason to expect the population of Russia will ever resist their President.
So I agree, completely, that any crowdsourced ‘war’ must assure the flow of information into Russia, just as it must assure the flow of food or medicine or any other essential supply. That’s not to deny that such platforms of access need to be vigilant about Russian influence or propaganda or control. Of course they must. But if Russian citizens cannot see what the world sees, then Russian citizens will not come to the judgment that the world has converged upon. Or at least, not in time. So yes, at a minimum, we need a clearer snese of the disengagement that is required or appropriate—and a clearer strategy to assure that such disengagement doesn’t destroy the implicit mechanism of a crowdsourced ‘war’: the hope that Russians will effect control over their government.
Beyond that, there’s one other point that we agree upon, and much left to disagreement.
Yes, the most effective alternative to hot war would be to end the flow of petrodollars into Putin’s Russia. But it is both a feature and a bug of democracy that one must recognize the democratic constraint on any state action. Europe is dependent on Russian carbon. If it ended that dependence tomorrow, the withdrawal would be devastating—to the people without heat or fuel or jobs—and hence, eventually, to their governments. Here, or at least in Europe, the view of the people is a real constraint on government. And so any strategy that depends upon citizens of the west suffering so that citizens of Russia don’t have to suffer so that the leader of Russia might be restored to sanity is not a strategy that could work. If there is a people who will suffer because of Putin’s war — beyond the innocents who he is waging war against—it will be Russians.
So that alternative to a crowdsourced ‘war’ won’t work. And the other alternative that you suggested — American troops in Ukraine—is either moot (since you imagined this happening before the invasion) or precisely the step that I thought we agreed was not possible. Russian military engaging with American military in a hot war is the beginning of the end — for everyone.
And so again, I don’t see what the alternative to this crowdsourced ‘war’ — more narrowly or rationally tailored—could be. It isn’t troops in Ukraine — that is hot war. It is not Europe paying the price—even if the most effective move against Putin, a democratic constraint makes it impossible. And so that leaves only your suggestion at the end that maybe, in fact, we should just do nothing.
Yet here again, I just don’t see how anyone could expect that to happen. Putin has violated a fundamental—if modern—norm: that nations do not wage aggressive wars for territory. (Vox has a brilliant piece about how that norm has become so central to modern international law. I hope you have the chance to access it.) You’re response to that “abstract legal principle,” as you put it, is to emphasize all the reasons that led to Russia’s invasion. But here’s the critical point: Those reasons have now been rendered besides the point. If you came across a man beating his wife in the village square, you wouldn’t first ask, “did she deserve it?” You would first stop the violence. There is no justification for this violence — whatever had happened before. Yet that there is no justification for such violence is not to excuse or endorse or ignore or forgive what happened before. It is simple to say: this is not how civilized nations respond.
So yes, there is plenty to criticize about the expansionism of NATO, and the obliviousness of the West to lots. (FAIR.org has a fantastic brief about what “unprovoked” misses as a description of this war.) But no peaceful error could justify this aggressive war. Murdering thousands, destroying billions in infrastructure and housing and hospitals and freaking nuclear power plants!, forcing millions to become refugees — nothing that happened before could justify or excuse that brutality. It may explain it—just as ‘dinner was late’ may explain the abusive husband’s violence against his wife. It cannot excuse it. And it certainly doesn’t excuse any passerby simply ignoring the violence and looking the other way.
Let us live in a world where if 70% of the nations condemn an aggressive war for territory, the citizens of that nation pay a punishing, if non-violent, crowdsourced price. I embrace that rule for the US and every other nation in the world. Because both alternatives—that the world look the other way, or that we engage the military to respond to violence with violence—are devastating. If we ignore Putin here, where will his “victory” lead? And if we engage with violence here, how will we hide from inevitable radiating fallout that such folly will yield?
Stay safe, friend. I hope you can get to a place where you can continue your principled and reflective work, and resistance, and where we can continue this exchange.
Specific responses below.
As the Russian government already banned FB, Twitter, and other media without VPN and similar services, people have no access to information and society is increasingly dependent on the state propaganda machine…. They just hit mainly those who already have been opposing Putin and make them weaker and less prepared for any kind of resistance.
This is a fantastic point. Nothing we do should weaken the opportunity for resistance within.
If the US had stationed in Ukraine some of its troops — aircrafts on the Ukrainian airfields and some military personnel — it would most probably have deterred the invasion. [When the USSR did that in Pakistan, t]hings were settled relatively quickly.
This assumes a level of rationality that is not evinced by the actual behavior we’re witnessing.
The West clearly doesn’t want to pay any serious price for this war to stop. In such a case, maybe yes — it is better to do nothing rather than make it worse. I think in global politics, Hippocrates’s principle should work as well.
As I’ve explained, yes, between the West paying the price and the people of Russia paying the price, the democratic constraint will always prefer the latter. But I don’t agree that doing nothing is doing no harm. Doing nothing is often doing lots of harm. Just ask Kitty Genovese.
Russia and Ukraine failed to find a way to live in peace as neighboring countries after the collapse and partition of the Soviet Union.
I still don’t get the non-new-speak sense of this sentence. You live in peace by not waging war. Did I miss Ukraine’s invasion of Russia? Yes, of course, there were efforts by Ukraine to put down separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. What nation would not put such efforts down? If Mexican Americans in Texas and New Mexico started insisting that the Mexican War was illegal and unjust (it was) and started an effort to separate New Mexico from the United States, would anyone doubt the response?
You cannot just focus on one abstract legal principle of territorial integrity to resolve this kind of long-lasting conflict.
I don’t think the Ukranians are experiencing this as “one abstract legal principle.” There is nothing abstract about the shelling of an apartment building or a children’s hospital. But yes, one principle doesn’t resolve a “long-lasting conflict.” It remains a principle. There remains the rest of the conflict to resolve.
And anyway, what is the nature of this “conflict” — beyond Putin’s resolve to reassemble the USSR? What is the justice in that? How many millions (Ukranians) died for that folly before. What possible reason — other than the ego of one aged KGB agent — could justify it now?
If we want to live in peace, it is not enough to comply with some abstract legal principles when there are serious tensions and conflicts in place.
It is not enough, sure. It is just the first step. If you are to live in peace, you must start with not waging war—especially an aggressive, territory grabbing war.
Sorry, but you know it would never happen.
There are two things that would never happen: I don’t think you’ll see any of the nations you think would never be sanctioned as Russia is being sanctioned now waging the kind of war Russia is waging. That’s not to deny how close to that sort of war the US’s war for the greater middle east has been. It is to insist only that it is different. And so if you never see a nation the equivalent of Russia (Germany, France, Britain, the United States, Mexico, Canada, etc.) waging an aggressive war for territory, then yes, you’ll never see 70% of the UN vote to condemn that action.
The only plausible counterexample is China and Taiwan — which explains lots about why China is responding to Russia as it is.
I understand you don’t call for any violent actions, but I don’t see how you can prevent this from happening as soon as you legalize a war (even in quotes) against the civilians based on their nationality. … As soon as you get people agitated and filled with hate against Russians it would be very difficult not to stop this crowdsourced war from becoming a hot one. I don’t see what the checks and balances are there.
First, and again, it is just as stupid to blame the Russian people for what Putin is doing as it is to blame Chinese for COVID.
But second, Alexey, it is certainly more likely that violence won’t happen if you commit to avoid violence than if you wage a hot war to the same end. Of course, no one can guarantee anything. The only “check” is the practiced resolve of the principle of non-violence. Don’t ignore injustice. Just don’t meet injustice with violence.
In the case of the crowdsourced war against the middle class in Russia, it is even worse — it helps Putin rather than deters him and it perfectly fits his isolationist narrative.
This is a strong claim which if true is devastating. If this is helping Putin, strengthening him, making it easier for him to wage war, then you’re right.
If my intuition is right and crowdsourced war is closer to this type of war, then a relatively contained regional war is a better option for humanity.
If a “relatively contained regional war” were possible, maybe. But American fighter jets shooting down Russian planes could never be a “relatively contained regional war.” It would only be the end.
